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 Economic Growth and Government Debt: Evidence




We investigate in this paper what are the main determinants of government and
external debt in Latin America. Our sample includes nine Latin American countries
that re-democratised in the last 30 years or so, and the data cover the period between
1970 and 2007. The results, based on principal component and dynamic panel data
analyses (we use the Pooled OLS, Fixed E⁄ects, Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Vari-
ables, DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM estimators), robustly suggest that economic growth,
presumably via the automatic stabilisers, has had the ability of reducing debt in the
region. Other important candidates suggested by the literature do not present clear-cut
estimates on debt. Essentially, this suggests that the tax-smoothing model still holds
in Latin America, which￿ in times of debt crisis￿ is very suggestive of the importance
of fast economic activity in keeping debt under control.
Keywords: Growth, debt, Latin America.
JEL Classi￿cation: H60, N16, O11, O54.I. Introduction and Summary
Latin America has been known, at least in the last thirty years or so, for political transi-
tions from (right-wing) dictatorships to more democratic regimes, macroeconomic instability
(some countries experienced debt crisis and also high rates of in￿ ation), delayed stabilisation
processes (in the spirit of Alesina and Drazen (1991)) and no come back to less democratic
regimes. Moreover, the region has been known for a certain, relatively above the average,
degree of economic inequality.
Against this background, and also with the current debt crisis a⁄ecting some south-
ern European countries and all its possible economic implications in mind, we investigate
what are the main determinants of government and external debt in the region, and it is
worth mentioning at this stage the importance of both variables (and their interconnections),
and debt rescheduling and default crisis in Latin America, particularly in the 1980s, which
coincide with some of the political and economic shocks that the region has su⁄ered.
To conduct the analysis we use data from nine Latin American countries which re-
democratised at some point in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and given data availability, we
cover the period between 1970 and 2007. For the empirical analysis we make use of principal
component and dynamic panel data analyses. More speci￿cally, we use the Pooled OLS,
Fixed E⁄ects, Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables, First Di⁄erence and SYSTEM
Generalised Method of Moments estimators.
In terms of results, ￿rstly we ￿nd some robust evidence that economic growth, via
the automatic stabilisers, is able to signi￿cantly, and smoothly, reduce debt in the region.
Secondly, we do not ￿nd conclusive evidence that the high rates of in￿ ation seen at the time
in the region have had any e⁄ect in increasing debt, which would occur via higher nominal
interest rates. Thirdly, there is no evidence that constraints on the executive, or checks and
balances, have had any e⁄ect in restraining spending and therefore debt. Fourthly, we are
not able to report evidence that inequality, which is believed to be prevalent in some of the
countries in the region has had any impact on debt, which would take place via some sort
1of redistribution, in the vein of Meltzer and Richard (1991). All in all, economic growth
is￿ amongst of the most popular candidates suggested by the literature￿ the variable to
have had a robust e⁄ect in reducing government and external debt in our analysis.
The subject has always attracted the attention of the profession, and there are always
new candidates (in addition to the tax-smoothing model) being proposed to explain govern-
ment and external debt alike, so that our understanding of what generates debt is constantly
being furthered. Barro (1979) argues, theoretically and empirically, that temporary increases
in income plays a countercyclical role on debt, and also that there is an expected e⁄ect of
in￿ ation on debt. In the Latin American case both variables are of particular interest in
the sense that the region has experienced some growth collapses (the so-called ￿ lost decade￿ )
and also some episodes of high in￿ ation in the past, which would have an e⁄ect in increasing
debt.
On a slightly di⁄erent vein, Berg and Sachs (1988) introduce the role of inequality to
study the probability of debt rescheduling in a sample of middle-income countries, and they
report that high inequality is a good predictor of debt. This is also interesting for our
purposes here because some countries in Latin American are perceived to be rather unequal.
Roubini and Sachs (1989) using a sample of OECD countries are able to report that
those countries are countercyclical. However, in Roubini and Sachs (1989) they report that
the same OECD countries are only weakly countercyclical when politically fragmented, or
when the political coalitions in power happen to be too polarised to ￿nd an agreement in
terms of debt creation and rescheduling. This is also related to the Latin American case
since our sample includes young democracies with, at the initial stages of democratisation,
rather fragmented coalitions.
Moreover, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) provides a theoretical framework which for-
malises the role of democracy, or alternating government coalitions, on debt. In this case the
incumbent, or outgoing in some cases, coalition would bequest the new competing coalition
coming into power with high debt to be repaid in the near future, which would ￿nancially
2constraint the new regime in its initial stages. This is also of interest to Latin America with
young democracies and di⁄erent coalitions coming into power. In similar vein, Edwards
and Tabellini (1991), and Roubini (1991) empirically suggest that the tax-smoothing model
does not hold in developing countries because of the political instability and inequality seen
in those societies. In addition, speci￿cally related to Latin America, Alesina et al. (1999)
propose the idea of debt ceilings as a solution for the perennial debt problems seen in the
region in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Furthermore, Easterly (2001) empirically suggests that the growth slowdowns of the
1980s and 1990s are to blame for the debt crisis that some developing countries (Latin
America included) faced at the time, which is some evidence for the tax-smoothing model.
On the other hand, Woo (2003) formally re-introduces the role of inequality in the debate.
He makes use of panel data and ￿nds that inequality, and also ￿nance, are related to larger
public de￿cits (via redistribution and easier access to ￿nance). Woo (2005 and 2008) extend
on his previous analysis and suggests that polarisation, or inequality, within the coalition in
power might generate a ￿ght for the common resources pool, which leads to higher de￿cits
and consequently output collapse.
Finally, Alesina, Tabellini and Campante (2008), also using panel data, suggest that
￿scal pro-cyclicality in developing countries takes place because the electorate attempts to
"starve the Leviathan", or to make sure to extract, during booms, from the government
all resources possible, before the coalition in power wastes those resources in more frivolous
activities.
Essentially, the literature suggests that the tax-smoothing model does not always apply,
particularly in developing countries, and that inequality and political instability might play
a role in how governments behave when spending and generating debt1. Given the above,
the value added of this paper to the literature is that we make use of a sample of Latin
American countries (all sharing some developing countries characteristics, but with their
own idiosyncrasies), which went through structural political and economic changes (not to
3mention severe shocks) in the last thirty years or so. This is interesting in itself because
with that sample we can disaggregate and further our knowledge on how governments have
been behaving over time in terms of debt creation in the region. Furthermore, we construct a
proxy for government and external debt based on principal component analysis that captures
what is common to di⁄erent variables for debt and that is believed to o⁄er more explanatory
power. Finally, we use di⁄erent dynamic panel data estimators to make sure that our results
are robust. It is therefore believed that we are able to provide some interesting evidence to
speci￿cally understand the recent history of Latin America, instead of treating the region
either as an outlier to be removed from the sample, or as a dummy variable.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: in the next sections we describe the data set,
the empirical methodology used, and then we present and discuss the main results obtained.
We then conclude and o⁄er some future research avenues that can be pursued from here.
II. Empirical Analysis
A. A Look at the Data
The data set covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and nine Latin American coun-
tries which transitioned from political dictatorship to full democracy at some point in the
late 1970s (Ecuador), 1980s (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay), and early
1990s (Guyana and Paraguay). In addition, most of these countries experienced hyperin￿ a-
tionary bursts during the period (the only exception is Paraguay), and growth collapses.
The variables used to measure government and external debt are the share of public
debt to GDP (DEBT), from the recently released Historical Public Debt Database by Abbas,
Belhocine, ElGanainy, and Horton, (2010) and provided by the IMF, and the share of external
debt to GDP (XDEBT), from the World Development Indicators which is provided by the
World Bank. With this information we can also make use of principal component analysis
and extract via spectral decomposition from these standardised data matrices the unobserved
common factors of these two, and rather popular in the literature, variables for government
4debt. We therefore end up with a proxy for debt, GOV ERN, which contributes to reduce
model uncertainty and that is believed to present more explanatory power. In this case, the
￿rst principal component￿ which roughly corresponds to the mean of the series￿ accounts
for 85% of the variation in the two above-mentioned variables. This is important because in
this case we are able to reduce the dimensionality of a set of prospective variables, and we
end up with a proxy that contains most of the information coming from di⁄erent candidates
for debt.
Information on GDP and economic growth (GROWTH) come from the Penn World
Table, and in this case it is expected that economies growing faster present lower debt, via
the automatic stabilisers. The control variables used are relatively standard in the literature
and they are as follows: a measure for trade openness relative to GDP (OPEN), which
is provided by the Penn World Table, and it is expected that more open economies tend
to display smaller debt (via higher exports taxes and imports tari⁄s). Moreover, we use
the share of the liquid liabilities to GDP (M2), which comes from the World Development
Indicators and are provided by the World Bank. In this case it is predicted that in economies
with better developed ￿nancial sectors governments can acquire ￿nance more easily and
therefore run higher public debt. The in￿ ation rates (INFLAT), also come from the World
Development Indicators, and it is expected that higher in￿ ation, via higher nominal interest
rates, leads to higher government debt.
Furthermore, the population (POP) and urbanisation (URBAN) series are from the
World Development Indicators, constraints on the executive (XCONST) come from the
Polity IV data set, government shares to GDP (GOV ) from the Penn World Table, and the
Gini coe¢ cients for income inequality (INEQ) from the UNU-WIDER data base. What is
expected from these control variables is that rapid population change and urbanisation in
developing countries lead to higher spending in infrastructure, more constrained executives
tend to be more restrained in how they generate public debt, higher participation in the
GDP must be somehow funded and it tends to lead to higher debt, and higher inequality
5leads to some sort of redistribution (usually via the provision of particular public goods or
via unfunded transfers), which might lead to higher government debt overall.
To brie￿ y illustrate the behaviour of the variables used to understand the behaviour
of government debt over time in the region￿ government debt to GDP (DEBT), external
debt to GDP (XDEBT) and the proxy for government debt itself (GOV ERN)￿ in Figure
One we plot in clockwise fashion all these normalised series against time. This initial eyeball
evidence suggests that these country averages increased during the late 1970s, and rather
dramatically in the early 1980s, which roughly coincide with the implementation of more
democratic regimes in the region (alternatively it can also coincide with the end of those
political dictatorships). Moreover, this dramatic increase in government debt in the early
1980s coincides with the hyperin￿ ationary episodes that most of those countries experienced
at the time. On the other hand, most debt series present a reasonably consistent reduction
from the 1990s onwards, which suggest that some time after democratisation and with the
macroeconomic stabilisation taking place in most of those countries, the size of debt has
actually decreased.
In addition, we plot the economic growth averages in the region, and it can be seen that
growth rates displayed even negative ￿gures in the 1980s (the ￿ lost decade￿ ), which coincide
with the sharp increase in public debt. However, those averages have been displaying a more
encouraging positive trend from the 1990s onwards, which also coincide with the reduction
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Figure 1: Government debt, external debt, government and economic growth, Latin America, 1970-2007.
Sources: IMF, World Bank and PWT.
Moreover, we provide the correlation matrix in Table One. Initially what can be seen
from this descriptive evidence is that all variables for debt are positively and signi￿cantly
correlated with each other, as it should be since￿ according to the principal component
analysis￿ they have so much in common. More speci￿cally to our purposes here, the statis-
tical correlations amongst our variables and proxy for government debt and economic growth
are all negative and mostly signi￿cant at the 5% level. Basically, these preliminary correla-
tions (without implying any causation at this stage) suggest that government debt decreases
with faster economic activity, or to put it another way, the automatic stabilisers seem to be
smoothly at work in the region.
7Table 1: The Correlation Matrix: Latin America, 1970-2007.
DEBT XDEBT GOVERN GROWTH
DEBT 1
XDEBT 0.709* 1
GOVERN 0.924* 0.924* 1
GROWTH -0.070 -0.274* -0.239* 1
Sources: IMF, World Bank and PWT ￿les. * represents signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Furthermore, in Figure Two we provide in clockwise fashion the OLS regression lines
amongst all variables for government and external debt and economic growth, and again there
is a negative relationship between government debt and faster economic activity, which sug-
gests ￿rstly an economic relationship between debt and growth, and secondly the importance
of the automatic stabilisers in reducing debt, or alternatively speaking, that the neoclassical
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Figure 2: OLS regression lines, government debt, external debt, government and economic growth, Latin
America, 1970-2007. Sources: IMF, World Bank and PWT.
In essence, the above preliminary evidence, with all its caveats, suggests that in one
way or another the size of government debt has decreased with faster economic activity,
via the automatic stabilisers, which is rather suggestive of the prediction provided by the
neoclassical model of tax smoothing, and particularly interesting in times of debt crisis that
we have been experiencing recently.
B. Empirical Strategy
In terms of empirical strategy, since we have a panel of nine Latin American countries
(N = 9) covering the period between 1970 and 2007 (T = 38), we follow the previous
literature and make use of dynamic panel (time-series) data analysis.
9Firstly, we use the baseline Pooled OLS (POLS) estimator which assumes homogeneity
of intercepts and slopes (a rather heroic assumption), and which gives equal weight to the
within (yit￿￿ yi) and between (￿ yi￿￿ y) variances in the data. Secondly, we make use of the one-
way Fixed E⁄ects (FE) estimator with robust standard errors for the correlation of residuals
over time, which assumes heterogeneity of intercepts (a reasonable assumption in such a
diverse panel of countries), and which makes use only of the within (￿ yi ￿ ￿ y) variation in the
data, which purges the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors.
Essentially, the FE estimator under T ! 1, not only minimises the Nickell bias present
in short T dynamic panels, but also reduces statistical endogeneity and provides consistent
estimates of the expected values.
Thirdly, although we attempt to use￿ given data availability￿ the most common control
variables in the literature, one would argue that omitted variables, measurement error, and
even some sort of (statistical or economic) endogeneity might be present. Therefore, we
initially make use of the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables (FE-IV) estimator which
provides asymptotically consistent and e¢ cient estimates when T ! 1, and the ￿rst lag of
economic growth is our identifying instrument for GROWTH (the growth literature suggests
that government debt are detrimental to economic growth).
Furthermore, controlling for the number of instruments￿ and for what we instrument￿
to avoid over￿tting (Bond (2002) and Roodman (2009)), we carefully make use ￿rstly of
the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) First-Di⁄erence GMM (DIF-GMM) which is based on the idea of using lags in levels
(yit￿2;:::;yi1) as instruments for the ￿rst-di⁄erenced model. Moreover, we take into account
the fact that persistent series might lead to weak instruments (and to a non-negligible small
sample bias) and make use of the GMM estimator that combines the usual moment conditions
for the DIF-GMM model above, with those extra conditions for the model in levels (￿yit￿1),
SYSTEM (SYS), or the SYS-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), and
Blundell and Bond (1998). Basically we instrument for the lagged dependent variable with
10levels dated t ￿ 3 and earlier, a standard assumption, and then again for GROWTH, for
INFLAT (some would argue that higher debt are behind higher in￿ ation), and for GOV
(it can be argued that the government share to GDP and debt are intrinsically related).
We therefore use these two GMM estimators, collapsing the lag range with robust standard
errors and the small-sample correction provided by Windmeijer (2005) to avoid "too good
to be true" standard errors.
All in all, the above-mentioned dynamic panel estimators take into account not only
the fact that those countries in the sample share particular characteristics, but also the
fact that such a panel is, no doubt, heterogenous (some of the countries in the sample
are more developed than others, or more or less unequal than others). Moreover, some of
these estimators take into consideration the possibility of omitted variables and measurement
error biases, and endogeneity and persistence issues, which are always advantageous for our
purposes here. The estimated di⁄erenced SYS-GMM dynamic equation is as follows,
￿GOV ERNit = ￿￿GROWTHit + ￿￿OPENit + ￿￿M2it + ￿￿INFLATit (1)
+￿￿URBANit + "￿XCONSTit + ￿￿GOVit + ￿￿POPit
+￿￿INEQit + #￿GOV ERNt￿1 + ￿￿it;
where GOV ERN is the proxy for government debt which comprises the unobserved common
factors between government debt to GDP and external debt to GDP, GROWTH are the
growth rates, OPEN is a measure for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabilities to GDP,
INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, URBAN is the share of urban population, XCONST
accounts for constraints on the executive, GOV for the share of government to GDP, POP
for population and INEQ are the Gini coe¢ cients for income inequality.
11C. Results and Discussion
In Table Two we regress the variable DEBT against GROWTH and the other con-
trol variables. Essentially, all GROWTH estimates are negative, and mostly statistically
signi￿cant, which initially highlights the importance of the automatic stabilisers in reduc-
ing government debt in the region. For instance, for every percent increase in GROWTH,
government debt would decrease by 1.3% per year in the dynamic SYS-GMM speci￿cation,
which is a respectable and plausible e⁄ect.
OPEN presents the predicted negative signs, with some estimates being statistically
signi￿cant, and M2 the expected positive estimates, with most of them being signi￿cant.
On the other hand, INFLAT has mostly (unexpected) negative estimates, however they
are not signi￿cant. A plausible economic explanation for these negative estimates is prob-
ably because some of those countries implemented nominal interest rate ceilings (￿nancial
repression) in the 1980s, which could have had an impact on in￿ ation and government debt.
The controls URBAN, XCONST, GOV and POP do not present clear-cut estimates
and their signi￿cance levels are far from ideal, as well as INEQ which does not present us
with any clear-cut estimate either. Finally, the Arellano and Bond m2 tests for second-order
serial correlation suggest that we can not reject the null hypothesis and the Sargan tests do
not indicate that the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM instrument sets are invalid (in this case the
instruments are not correlated with the residuals in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced equation).
12Table Two: POLS, FE and GMM Estimates
Dynamic Models
DEBT POLS FE FE-IV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
GROW -1.51 (-5.35) -1.45 (-3.91) -5.56 (-1.43) -.287 (-0.74) -1.33 (-4.52)
OPEN -.078 (-1.12) -.270 (-2.53) -.190 (-0.84) -3.59 (-2.10) -.040 (-0.42)
M2 .302 (2.34) .381 (1.90) -.140 (-0.25) .787 (1.68) .353 (1.69)
INFLAT -2.29 (-0.89) -1.82 (-1.48) -7.78 (-1.09) 6.73 (1.47) -3.89 (-1.09)
URBAN .156 (1.18) .200 (0.19) .542 (0.27) -5.89 (-1.58) .209 (1.43)
XCONST .105 (0.16) .331 (0.44) 1.98 (0.95) -4.73 (-3.47) -.775 (-1.18)
GOV .618 (1.35) .583 (0.99) -1.27 (-0.63) .899 (0.51) .485 (0.68)
POP -.503 (-0.31) 3.15 (0.19) -10.05 (-0.19) -276.49 (-1.52) 1.58 (0.64)
INEQ .180 (0.69) .450 (0.95) .078 (0.11) 1.06 (1.35) -.036 (-0.13)
DEBT1 .860 (27.88) .842 (27.52) .935 (8.69) .418 (5.01) .858 (22.31)
F test 99.78
m2 (p) .723 .620
Sargan 1.00 1.00
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. DEBT is the government debt to GDP,
GROWTH are the GDP growth rates, OPEN is a measure for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabil-
ities to GDP, INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, URBAN is the share of urban population, XCONST
the constraints on the executive, GOV the government share to GDP, POP the population and INEQ
are the Gini coe¢ cients for income inequality. POLS is the Pooled OLS, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects, FE-IV is
the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables and the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM are the First Di⁄erence
and System Generalised Method of Moments estimators.
In Table Three we regress XDEBT against GROWTH and also the other controls.
Again, the GROWTH estimates are all negative and mostly statistically signi￿cant, with
DIF-GMM being the only exception in terms of statistical signi￿cance in this case. This
suggests once more the role of the automatic stabilisers in reducing debt and the impor-
13tance of the tax-smoothing model in the region. For instance, for every percent increase in
GROWTH, external debt would decrease by 1.5% per year in the dynamic FE speci￿cation,
which is again a plausible e⁄ect.
OPEN presents the predicted negative signs again, with some of the estimates being
statistically signi￿cant, and INFLAT keep its negative sign with most of the estimates being
signi￿cant. On the other hand, M2 does not present us with entirely convincing estimates
this time.
The other control variables do not present clear estimates in terms of signs either, with
some of them actually ￿ ipping signs, nor in terms of statistical signi￿cance. Finally, the
Arellano and Bond, and Sargan tests do not suggest that the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM
instrument sets are in anyway invalid.
14Table Three: POLS, FE and GMM Estimates
Dynamic Models
XDEBT POLS FE FE-IV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
GROW -1.59 (-6.73) -1.56 (-5.18) -4.37 (-1.98) -.253 (-0.65) -1.67 (-4.26)
OPEN -.116 (-1.72) -.056 (-0.69) -.001 (-0.01) -2.51 (-2.17) -.126 (-1.15)
M2 -.107 (-.088) -.151 (-0.82) -.523 (-1.46) -.073 (-0.45) -.341 (-2.29)
INFLAT -4.33 (-2.17) -4.18 (-2.46) -10.25 (-1.86) -2.58 (-1.12) -1.65 (-0.59)
URBAN .079 (0.68) -1.31 (-1.81) -2.04 (-1.55) -3.62 (-1.79) .129 (0.66)
XCONST .533 (0.90) .113 (0.21) 1.53 (1.02) -5.31 (-4.95) -.469 (-0.41)
GOV .517 (1.35) .950 (2.79) -.048 (-0.05) 2.19 (3.96) -.062 (-0.11)
POP -2.92 (-1.91) 45.91 (2.12) 50.09 (1.35) -390.92 (-3.67) -5.61 (-2.80)
INEQ .407 (1.60) .447 (0.79) .360 (0.77) 1.82 (2.80) .587 (1.93)
XDEBT1 .888 (21.33) .872 (13.26) .989 (8.71) .245 (1.70) .843 (9.41)
F test 58.08
m2 (p) 0.964 0.136
Sargan 1.00 1.00
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. XDEBT is the external debt to GDP,
GROWTH are the GDP growth rates, OPEN is a measure for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabil-
ities to GDP, INFLAT are the in￿ ation rates, URBAN is the share of urban population, XCONST
the constraints on the executive, GOV the government share to GDP, POP the population and INEQ
are the Gini coe¢ cients for income inequality. POLS is the Pooled OLS, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects, FE-IV is
the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables and the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM are the First Di⁄erence
and System Generalised Method of Moments estimators.
In Table Four we regress our proxy GOV ERN, which captures the common factors be-
tween government debt and external debt, against GROWTH as well as the other controls.
As we would expect by now, GROWTH follows the same pattern as before, with estimates
being negative, and except for the DIF-GMM one, all other estimates are statistically signif-
15icant. These results somehow vindicate the neoclassical tax-smoothing prediction and help
to bring the, somehow forgotten, role of the automatic stabilisers back to the discussion of
debt in general.
OPEN and INFLAT present similar estimates as before, with both variables having
the e⁄ect of reducing debt (OPEN via higher taxes and tari⁄s, and INFLAT probably
via the pervasive and distortionary channel of ￿nancial repression), however those estimates
are not entirely always signi￿cant. The liquid liabilities as well as URBAN, XCONST,
GOV , POP and INEQ do not present clear-cut estimates from which we can draw a more
de￿nitive picture in terms of their roles on debt. Finally, about the validity of the instrument
set, the Arellano and Bond, and Sargan tests again do not detect any evidence of invalidity
or proliferation of instruments within the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM framework.
16Table Four: POLS, FE and GMM Estimates
Dynamic Models
GOVERN POLS FE FE-IV DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
GROW -.075 (-7.21) -.072 (-4.96) -.238 (-1.85) -.022 (-1.44) -.068 (-5.75)
OPEN -.003 (-1.35) -.006 (-2.23) -.002 (-0.28) -.129 (-2.05) -.003 (-0.98)
M2 .002 (0.44) .003 (0.52) -.018 (-0.89) .011 (0.76) .000 (0.02)
INFLAT -.139 (-1.45) -.116 (-2.70) -.358 (-1.39) .060 (0.36) -.068 (-0.84)
URBAN .006 (1.24) -.014 (-0.39) .000 (0.00) -.097 (-0.71) .009 (1.42)
XCONST .011 (0.43) .000 (0.00) .069 (0.92) -.217 (-3.33) -.024 (-0.78)
GOV .015 (0.94) .019 (0.81) -.055 (-0.80) .009 (0.16) .005 (0.22)
POP -.068 (-1.05) .861 (1.16) .208 (0.10) -16.55 (-2.72) -.084 (-1.12)
INEQ .010 (0.97) .012 (0.59) -.003 (-.012) .053 (1.86) .009 (0.73)
GOVERN1 .904 (23.63) .890 (24.67) 1.02 (8.19) .404 (3.57) .878 (19.59)
F test 68.99
m2 (p) 0.976 0.673
Sargan 1.00 1.00
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. GOV ERN is the proxy which captures
the common factors of government debt and external debt to GDP, GROWTH are the GDP growth rates,
OPEN is a measure for trade openness, M2 are the liquid liabilities to GDP, INFLAT are the in￿ ation
rates, URBAN is the share of urban population, XCONST the constraints on the executive, GOV the
government share to GDP, POP the population and INEQ are the Gini coe¢ cients for income inequality.
POLS is the Pooled OLS, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects, FE-IV is the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables
and the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM are the First Di⁄erence and System Generalised Method of Moments
estimators.
All in all, economic growth is the only variable which actually follows the predicted
pattern, presenting negative and statistically signi￿cant estimates against government and
external debt in the region. Essentially this indicates not only the importance of the au-
17tomatic stabilisers, but also the importance of faster economic activity on debt reduction,
which is of particular importance in light of the severe debt crisis that southern Europe is
experiencing at the moment. Above all, the tax-smoothing (neoclassical) model is still valid
in the region in the sense that debt increased rather dramatically during the political and
economic transitions that the region went through in the 1980s (the war period), however the
economic recovery that followed (the peace period) has played an important role in reducing
debt in those young democracies of Latin America. Alternatively it can be said that there
is no evidence for the "starve the Leviathan" story in the region2.
Moreover, in￿ ation is an important variable which presents (unexpected) negative es-
timates. This is probably because some of those countries engaged in interest rate controls
(￿nancial repression), which would arti￿cially reduce the impact of higher nominal inter-
est rates on debt, while others had completely indexed economies during their episodes of
hyperin￿ ation. It is plausible that overall both e⁄ects are cancelling each other out.
Furthermore, our variable XCONST, accounting for checks and balances on the ex-
ecutive, is not playing a de￿nitive role in reducing debt in the region, although the GMM
estimates are negative and mostly signi￿cant. This is perhaps because ￿scal responsibility
laws, and central bank independence, were only implemented in some countries towards the
end of the 1990s, and it is plausible to assume that because of this the data are still not
picking those institutional changes up, which are believed to restrain the way governments
behave.
In addition, an old determinant of redistribution, which would lead to bigger government
debt, inequality, does not play its predicted role in the region either. This is perhaps because,
although Latin America is known for being relatively unequal, in fact not all those countries
are actually that unequal (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, to mention a few, do not present
high Gini coe¢ cients of their own, and Brazil has presented decreasing inequality since the
stabilisation of the 1990s￿ see Bittencourt (2011) for a recent analysis of the Brazilian case).
Alternatively, some would argue that new democratic coalitions coming into power, even
18when supposedly from the left, will try to disguise themselves and avoid engaging in leftist
redistribution (Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2011)), which might be a mitigating factor of
the e⁄ect of inequality on debt3.
D. Final Observations
In this paper we have investigated the role of economic growth, via the automatic sta-
bilisers, or the tax-smoothing model, and also other important variables on government
and external debt. The results, based on a sample of Latin American countries that have
gone through particular political (democratisation) and economic (growth collapses and hy-
perin￿ ationary episodes) structural changes in the last thirty years or so, and on principal
component and dynamic panel data analyses, indicates that faster economic activity is the
only variable that consistently and signi￿cantly has been able to reduce debt in the region.
The importance of this study is that we have been able to speci￿cally study the Latin
American case, with all its idiosyncrasies, without having to incur in generalisations which are
not always warranted (in particular about the roles of in￿ ation, constraints on the executive
and inequality on debt), nor to treat the region either as a dummy or as an outlier to be
removed from the sample. With that we have been able to further our understanding of the
recent history of the region in terms of government and external debt during an eventful
period of its history, which might also be of use to understand the importance that faster
economic growth can play on the current debt crisis that some southern European countries
are experiencing at the moment. All in all, the tax-smoothing model holds in Latin America
and there is no reason to believe that it will not hold in other regions, so the importance of
promoting sustained economic activity.
Future research can be extended to further disaggregations and comparisons. For in-
stance, some transition economies from eastern Europe have also been through important
political and economic structural changes in the last twenty years or so, and understanding
the role, if any, of economic growth on debt will certainly be informative for the region.
19Moreover, needless to say that understanding the current debt crisis in Europe is of para-
mount importance, and the analysis conducted here can be extended to that particular group
of countries. On a more methodological note, non-stationarity and cointegration in panels is
something to be thought, although in this speci￿c case most of the variables used are bounded
within closed intervals, or stationary be default. Spatial dependence, given the nature of the
region, is perhaps a more feasible issue which can be explored in future research.
Essentially, perhaps the main lesson from the above analysis is the need for a return
to the basics in terms of understanding government and external debt, and the role and
relevance of economic activity in keeping debt under control. This is interesting in itself,
since the lesson, or the main policy implication, coming from the analysis is about promoting
economic activity, which somehow contrasts with some of the policies being implemented in
Europe to tackle the crisis, which are more along the lines of (not) generating faster economic
activity.
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1A parallel literature dealing with political budget cycles is also of some interest for
the Latin American case, however we refrain from dealing explicitly with those issues in this
paper. In any case, see Rogo⁄and Sibert (1988), Rogo⁄(1990), Gonzalez (2002), Akhmedov
and Zhuravskaya (2004), Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson (2006), and Brender
and Drazen (2007) for more on this.
2We also have used the Random Coe¢ cients estimator and the estimates are quantita-
tively and qualitatively equivalent to those reported above. Available on request.
3In this vein, some would argue instead that since those outgoing dictatorships presented a
right-wing ￿ avour, the ￿rst democratic coalitions coming into power would be of a more left-
wing nature. However, this is an unwarranted generalisation, e.g. Alfonsin and Sarney (the
￿rst Argentinean and Brazilian civilian Presidents) were not representatives of any left-wing
coalition (Alfonsin￿ s coalition was not related to the Peronist party, and Sarney￿ s coalition
excluded the main leftist parties). Nevertheless, both coalitions engaged in redistributive
policies, which leaves the literature on ideology on not so clear grounds at the moment.
24